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ABSTRACT. Farm households in developing countries are generally credit constrained.
This forces them to simultaneously take production and consumption decisions. In this
paper, a two-period lifecycle model of the farm household is constructed and the house-
hold’s investment response to changes in land and agricultural output prices are derived
theoretically. It is shown that in the absence of credit markets household responses to
exogenous price changes may differ from the predictions of cost–benefit analysis. Farm
household responses are also derived for the case where price increases for land and
agricultural output are accompanied by the introduction of a credit market. For this case
the results show that farm household reactions are in accordance with predictions made
by cost–benefit analysis. An empirical case study from Bénin underscores the relevance
of considering access to credit in establishing whether investments in soil conservation
are beneficial to farm households.
1. Introduction
Degradation of the natural environment and soil degradation especially are
a serious problem in many parts of the world. Oldeman, Hakkeling, and
Sombroek (1990) estimate that since 1945 1.2 billion hectares of agricultural
land have been moderately or strongly degraded as a result of human
activity. It has been argued (e.g., World Bank, 1992) that price distortions
have played an important role in encouraging activities that damage the
quality of the soil. If this argument is correct, higher prices of land and/or
output will increase the value of land conservation efforts, thereby encour-
aging greater conservation of natural resources. Cost–benefit analysis
based on a given time discount rate usually supports this argument.1
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1 Higher prices of land and/or output in the current period may actually lead to
increased soil mining and land degradation, in spite of higher benefits in future
periods from land conservation (LaFrance, 1992; Pagiola, 1996). In this paper we
will therefore focus on the effect of higher future land and/or output prices on
land conservation. In this case cost–benefit analysis based on a given time dis-
count rate will point to an unambiguous positive effect on land conservation.
The aim of this paper is to show that the expected results only come
about in case of the existence of well-functioning credit markets. In their
absence, no straightforward relationship exists between removing price
distortions and farmers’ incentives to invest in the conservation of their
natural capital base. The reason for this is that higher future prices for agri-
cultural produce or land may increase the discount rate of farmers who
cannot borrow and therefore investment becomes less attractive. This may
lead to perverse investment reactions with increased price incentives.
Farmers who can borrow face an exogenously given discount rate given by
the interest rate, and therefore they are not negatively affected by
increased price incentives.
To show this an intertemporal agricultural household model is con-
structed. The reason for developing this type of model is that it is capable
of simultaneously analysing production and consumption decisions. This
is required because, in the absence of well-functioning credit markets, agri-
cultural households cannot make investment decisions in isolation of
consumption decisions.
The existence of a potential trade-off between farm consumption and
investment has long been recognized (Chayanov, 1925; Singh, Squire, and
Strauss, 1986; de Janvry, Fafchamps, and Sadoulet, 1991; Phimister, 1995).
Also in the environmental literature, a growing body of literature focuses
on the interactions between production and consumption decisions by
farmers if there are market imperfections. Imperfect credit markets may
lead to very high rates of time preference and therefore to less environ-
mental conservation (Holden, Shiferaw, and Wik, 1998). They may also
lead to more environmental conservation because the future disutility of
degrading the resource is potentially unbounded with a subsistence
requirement (Pagiola, 1995). With a missing labour market, investment in
conservation will increase with the labour endowment of households
(Barbier, 1998) and growth in the non-farm rural sector may have a nega-
tive impact on soil conservation (Pender and Kerr, 1998; Romano, 1999).
And if risk and insurance markets are missing, poverty may lead to more
or less soil conservation (Grepperud, 1997).
This paper contributes to this literature by analysing the effect of price
changes on soil conservation within the framework of a non-separable
farm household model, and by comparing the results with those derived
from cost–benefit analysis. In our discussion we will use the net present
value (NPV) criterion or ‘standard’ definition of the ‘cost–benefit
approach’. It is this approach which has been used most extensively in
project evaluation as well as in evaluating the attractiveness of soil conser-
vation efforts. Although cost–benefit analysis is usually associated with
analysis at a fairly aggregated project level, it can also be used at the farm
level (Lutz et al. 1994, Araya and Asafu-Adjaye, 1999). Standard
cost–benefit analysis compares the discounted costs of investments with
the discounted benefits from investment. If investments are made in the
present, and benefits are derived in the future, then cost–benefit analysis
claims that an investment should be made if the current (opportunity) cost
of investment is lower than the future discounted (net) benefits from this
investment
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p0
n  
T
t1
Bt (1)
where p0
n is the cost of investment in period t  0, Bt the (net) benefit from
this investment in the future period t(t  1, . . ., T), T the last period that the
investment generates a benefit, and t the discount rate in period t. The
choice of an appropriate discount rate depends on the presence or absence
of market imperfections. If there are no market imperfections (such as the
absence of insurance and credit markets, lack of clear property rights,
information on prices and technology), then the appropriate discount rate
is the exogenously given market rate of interest rt in period t. If there are
market imperfections, then the appropriate discount rate is given by the
shadow price of time for the household.
The paper shows that even if the future discounted benefits of an invest-
ment increase (because Bt increases in formula (1)), the household may
actually be less inclined to invest, because the household’s discount rate
varies also with the height of current and future consumption and there-
fore with future benefits. Only if the increase in benefits weighs up against
changes in the discount rate (that is, the changes in the shadow price of
time), will it be beneficial to invest. Standard cost–benefit analysis ignores
these changes in the discount rate, and therefore may give incorrect pre-
scriptions. The paper develops a model to show under which conditions
this might be the case and presents a case study from the Atacora region in
Bénin to suggest the empirical relevance of this phenomenon.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 reflections are presented
on the cost–benefit analysis of soil degradation. The model is constructed
in section 3. In section 4 the reactions of a household (i) to increases in the
price of land and (ii) to higher agricultural output prices are presented in
the absence and presence of credit markets. In section 5 we discuss why the
results from the intertemporal model may deviate from the predictions
made on the basis of standard cost–benefit analysis. In section 6 we
provide an empirical case study from Bénin to illustrate the empirical rel-
evance of our findings. Section 7 concludes.
2. Cost–benefit analysis of soil degradation
Many cultivation practices tend to degrade land over time, reducing its
actual or potential uses. Cultivation practices can expose soil to water and
wind erosion; repeated tillage can weaken soil structure; crop production
can remove nutrients; and use of machinery can lead to soil compaction.
Land degradation, in turn, is the cause of stagnating or declining yields
and thus threatens the generation of income of the many people whose
primary source of income is derived from agriculture.
Typically in analyses on the adoption of conservation measures by
farmers, a wide range of factors is included. Pagiola (1996) distinguishes
biophysical characteristics and their relation to investment returns and
costs; Lutz et al. (1994) indicate that the adoption of conservation measures
depends on their cost and benefits as determined by agro-ecological con-
ditions, technologies used, prices of inputs used, and outputs produced;
Anim (1999) finds that awareness about increases in long-term profits
1

(1  t)
t
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contributes to the adoption of conservation measures, whereas Shively
(1997) shows that the combination of increased returns and increased pro-
duction risk may lead to adoption of conservation technologies by farmers
with specific risk preferences. Lapar and Pandey (1999) report that the
high cost of establishment, maintenance and loss of land to hedgerows are
major constraints for the adoption of these conservation methods in the
Philippines. As a consequence these authors call for the development of a
‘range of cost-effective technologies’. What these studies have in common
is their reliance, implicit or explicit, on a cost–benefit approach.
One of the underlying assumptions of the cost–benefit approach is that
production and consumption decisions are taken recursively: the house-
hold first optimizes its production decisions and then considers its
consumption (and savings) in light of the income obtained from produc-
tion. In case of investment decisions—which are intertemporal by
nature—it requires the existence of credit markets as they allow to tem-
porarily increase the availability of resources through borrowing. Only
under these circumstances it is possible to delink the allocation of
resources to consumption from decisions on investment outlays.
It is precisely the absence of (credit) markets that characterizes devel-
oping countries (Hoff, Baverman, and Stiglitz, 1993). High information,
monitoring and transaction costs, lack of collateral following unenforceable
property rights, and moral hazard problems all contribute to absent or mal-
functioning credit markets in these economies. Imperfect credit markets are
not only a characteristic of underdeveloped countries, Miller et al. (1993)
show that credit restrictions also hold for farms in the European Union.
If there is no credit market the farm household must equate its current
income to consumption and investments. In such circumstances predic-
tions based on cost–benefit analysis are no longer incontestably valid. To
illustrate this, consider the following example in which farmers are given
three options to invest in soil quality: low, medium, or high investment. In
period 1 farmers have ten units available which they can either consume
or invest. Returns to investment are positive but have decreasing marginal
returns. Utility in each period t is a concave function of consumption Ct
and given by log (Ct/1000)/(Ct/1000). We assume that the interest rate and
discount rate are 20 per cent, although similar examples can be constructed
for different rates.
Panel A of table 1 analyses the investment behaviour if there is no credit
market. The first three columns of panel A show that the farmer chooses a
medium investment level, giving the highest discounted utility. The last
three columns of panel A analyse the investment behaviour after a 100 per
cent increase in the output price in period 2. Because of the price doubling,
each investment level generates a consumption level which is twice as high
in the second period. In this case a utility-maximizing farmer chooses a
lower investment, because there is less need to invest given the high returns
in the second period and the desire to smooth consumption over both
periods (because of the concavity of the utility function). However, from
the point of view of the NPV criterion a high investment level becomes
more attractive, as the NPV of high investment is greater than the NPV of
any of the other investment options after the price increase. Panel B
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analyses the investment behaviour if there is a credit market. In this case
the farmer will borrow to smooth consumption across the two periods, and
invest according to the NPV criterion. In particular, the farmer will invest
more after an increase in the output price in the second period in line with
the cost–benefit criterion. The last row in each panel reports the marginal
rate of intertemporal substitution (MRS) for each investment option. The
MRS is constant for the case where there is a credit market but varies
across investment options and prices if there is no credit market. In section
5 it will be shown that it is precisely this variation in the MRS which may
cause household behaviour to deviate from cost–benefit predictions.
This illustration thus shows that in situations where credit markets are
malfunctioning, increases in NPV do not always lead to more investment.
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Table 1. Farm household investment in the presence and absence of liquidity
constraints
No credit market
Price increase: 100%
Amount invested Amount invested
Low Medium High Low Medium High
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A
Consumption period 1 9.0 8.0 7.0 9.0 8.0 7.0
Invested amount 1.0 2.0 3.0 1.0 2.0 3.0
Return on investment 9.0 12.0 13.0 9.0 12.0 13.0
Consumption period 2 9.0 12.0 13.0 18.0 24.0 26.0
NPV investment 6.5 8.0 7.8 14.0 18.0 18.7
NPV additional
investment 1.5 0.2 4.0 0.7
Discounted utility
in ‘000 0.417 0.396 0.429 0.308 0.318 0.359
MRS 1.00 2.39 3.76 4.44 10.64 16.81
Credit market
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel B
Consumption period 1 9.0 9.8 9.7 13.1 15.3 15.6
Invested amount 1.0 2.0 3.0 1.0 2.0 3.0
Return on investment 9.0 12.0 13.0 9.0 12.0 13.0
Consumption period 2 9.0 9.8 9.7 13.1 15.3 15.6
Borrowed amount 0.0 1.8 2.7 4.1 7.3 8.6
Loan repayment 0.0 2.2 3.3 4.9 8.7 10.4
NPV investment 6.5 8.0 7.8 14.0 18.0 18.7
NPV additional
investment 1.5 0.2 4.0 0.7
Discounted utility
in ‘000 0.417 0.375 0.379 0.264 0.218 0.212
MRS 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Notes: (1) the interest and discount rate are 20%, (2) MRS  marginal rate of
intertemporal substitution
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In fact they may make it more attractive to lower investment. To illustrate
this result formally, we construct in the next section a model that describes
the farmer’s intertemporal optimization problem.
3. A model of the farm household
The model begins with a representative household that maximizes an
intertemporal utility function which is assumed to be additive with a
strictly concave subutility function U(.), defined over consumption in each
period. It is assumed that at the beginning of the first period the household
plans its consumption and production levels for all periods, both current
and future (eq. (2)). Perfect foresight is assumed with regard to prices and
yields and we abstain from the incorporation of uncertainty. The model is
constructed as a two-period lifecycle model.
In the absence of credit markets, the household is limited in its intertem-
poral optimization. Only through costly investments in soil conservation
is it able to transfer income from the first period to the next at the expense
of consumption in the first period. The amount of natural capital is mea-
sured in efficiency units, which include the quantity of land as well as its
quality. Investments in soil conservation amount to adding efficiency
units to the natural capital stock, either by increasing the amount of land
under cultivation or by improving the quality of the soil. Here we assume
that investments focus on the latter, that is investment in the quality of the
soil, such as the construction of physical soil conservation structures.
Income is obtained from agricultural production and is generated by uti-
lizing natural capital (land) in a strictly concave production process. Thus
in the first period consumption and investment expenditures equal income
from agricultural production (eq. (3)). Investment is multiplied by the
price per efficiency unit of investment in the quality of the soil to reflect
labour cost or expenses for the use of equipment. In the second period,
consumption equals income from agricultural production plus the sale of
natural capital at the end of the second period (eq. (4)). This is the usual
closing condition for household decisions in a lifecycle model. The natural
capital stock depreciates over time under the influence of human action at
rate . The total amount of capital stock in the second period equals the
depreciated initial capital stock plus investments undertaken to counter or
improve on this (eq. (5)).2
The model is formulated as follows:
maximize
U  U(C1)  (2)
subject to
p1 f (K1)  C1  p1
n I1 (3)
U(C2)

1  
2 Of course farmers often do not invest in more natural capital, but they invest in
reducing the rate of depreciation . For the model this does not make much dif-
ference, since in both circumstances investments contribute to increased
production in the following year.
p2 f (K2)  p2
n(1  )K2  C2 (4)
K2  (1  ) K 1  I1 (5)
The subscripts indicate the time period (t  1, 2).
Exogenous variables included in this model are:
pt, output price; K1, initial stock of natural capital (land); p
t
n, cost of
(investing in) natural capital; , rate of time preference; and, , rate of
capital depreciation.
Endogenous variables are: Ct, consumption in period t; I1, investments in
period 1; and, K2, capital stock at the beginning of period 2.
Assuming an interior solution, the maximization problem can be solved
using the Lagrange method
LU(C1)   1p1 f (K1)  C1  p1n(K2  (1  )K1)  2p2 f(K2)
 p2
n(1  )K2  C2
This results in the following first-order conditions
  1  0 (6)
  2  0 (7)
 0 ⇒ p2  p1
n  p2
n (1  ) (8)
Conditions (6) and (7) imply
(1  )  (9)
or, the marginal rate of intertemporal substitution of consumption multi-
plied by 1 plus the pure rate of time preference, equals the ratio of
variables associated with the two consumption constraints. In the fol-
lowing the function h(C1,C2) is defined to represent the marginal rate of
intertemporal substitution . This function is decreasing with
respect to C1 and increasing with respect to C2. This follows from the strict
concavity of the subutility functions
 0 and 	 0
Now, after rearrangement the following three equations determine the
levels of optimal natural capital K2 and consumption levels C1 and C2 for
the farm household if the household does not have access to credit
p1 f (K1)  C1  p1
n(K2  (1  )K1)  0 (10)
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

C2

h(C1, C2)

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
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
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
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
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
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
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1

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
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p2 f (K2)  p2
n (1  )K2  C2  0 (11)
(1  )h(C1, C2) p1
n p2
n (1  )  0 (12)
Since the household is credit constrained these three equations jointly
determine the household’s response to exogenous changes in prices. These
responses are derived theoretically in the next section.
4. Changes in the price of land and output in the presence and absence
of credit markets
One way to preserve natural capital suggested by cost–benefit analysis is
to increase the (future) value of land or of its output, on the premise that
additional investments in soil conservation will be induced by the
increased return on these investments. Increasing the price of natural
capital can be realized by improving the market for land in such a way that
the demand for land increases. The provision of tradable property rights is
one potential step in this direction. In many countries, land acquisition
possibilities are restrained by traditional law, effectively forbidding out-
siders to obtain land, or by governments preventing foreigners to acquire
land. Other means to increase the demand (and hence the price of natural
capital) are abolishing taxes on the transfer of land, eliminating bureau-
cratically determined prices, or reducing tenure insecurity. Increasing
population pressure will also increase the demand for land. All these chan-
nels have been advanced as potential means to prevent land degradation
(Ervin, 1986; Wachter, 1992; Tiffen, Mortimore, and Gichuki, 1994; Hayes,
Roth, and Zepeda, 1997). Another way to induce investments in soil con-
servation, at least according to cost–benefit analysis, is by increasing the
future price of agricultural output. In view of the many distortions that
exist for output prices, this can be brought about by abolishing fixed prices
by marketing boards (assuming that they are fixed below market prices) or
by reducing export taxes. Changes in the agricultural policies of the EU
and the US leading to higher world market prices for agricultural produce
have also been advanced as ways to ensure the protection of fertile agri-
cultural land. The question now is whether these suggestions for soil
conservation also hold in a context characterized by malfunctioning credit
markets.
To explore this, first consider the effect of a foreseen increase in the price
of land in the absence of credit markets. This effect is determined simul-
taneously by the equations (10), (11), and (12). Applying the implicit
function theorem, differentiating with respect P1
n to and applying Cramer’s
rule gives
 ((1  ))  (1  )K2 (1  )p1n (13)
where A is the determinant of the matrix which is negative by assump-
tion (appendix). Given that A is negative, the overall effect on
investments in soil conservation following a perceived price change in the
second period for land is ambiguous as the sign of the first factor of equa-

h (C1, C2)


C2
1

A
1

A

K2


p2
n
p2df (K2)


K2
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tion (13) is positive and of the second negative. This result can be explained
intuitively as the first factor indicates that investments in soil protection
increase when the marginal return to the sale of natural capital (land) is
higher but decrease when an increase in the second period consumption
goes at the expense of first period consumption.
Next the farmers’ response to investments in natural capital in the
expectation of higher agricultural output prices is determined in a similar
fashion. Now we get
  f (K2) (1  )p1
n (14)
Again the result is ambiguous: the first term of equation (14) is positive but
the second is negative. Investments in soil protection increase when the
marginal return to capital is higher (the first term) but decrease when an
increase in the second period consumption goes at the expense of first
period consumption. In both instances, the trade-off between current and
future consumption levels results in a unpredictable household response
to increases in future land or agricultural output prices.
Next a credit market is introduced in a way that allows farm households
to access it. Does the model then provide responses which are in line with
predictions made by cost–benefit analysis?
If a credit market is incorporated in the model, equations (1) to (4) have
to be changed to include the fact that money can be borrowed or lent at the
market rate of interest (r) and has to be repaid with interest, or is returned
with interest later. The total amount borrowed in period t is indicated in the
revised model by Dt. Dependent on whether a household has savings or is
indebted, Dt is smaller or greater than zero. We start from the premise that
at the beginning of the first period, the household does not hold any debt
or savings. In period 1—equation (16)—the household is able to increase
the funds available to it or to set aside savings. In the second period
interest payments have to be made or are received. The closing condition
is that the household does not hold any debts or savings at the end of the
second period. The model now becomes
maximize
U  U(C1)  (15)
subject to
p1 f(K1)  D1  C1  p1
n I1 (16)
p2 f(K2)  p2
n(1  )K2  D1  C2  rD1 (17)
K2  (1  )K1  I1 (18)
How does this affect the household’s response to anticipated increases in
agricultural output or land prices? Solving the first-order conditions of the
Lagrangian we get
(1  )  1  r (19)
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

U(C2)/
C2
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
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
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 0 ⇒  (1  r)p1
n  p2
n(1  ). (20)
which is basically identical to equations (8) and (9) but with (1/2)
replaced by (1  r). In equations (19) and (20) the interest rate r plays a
dual role. It determines the investment decision of (20) and the allocation
of consumption over time (19), but thanks to the possibility to borrow the
household can separate its consumption and investment decisions. Hence
it can first decide on the natural capital stock it desires—which of course 
is done in a way such that the marginal return to capital in the second
period equals the cost of capital (1  r)p1
n  p2
n (1  ), after which
it allocates the resources for consumption between the two periods—of
course such that the marginal rate of substitution equals the market rate of
interest plus one (1  r).
It follows that in the presence of credit markets the farm household
responds to changes in prices as if it were a profit-maximizing producer.
Investment decisions are no longer affected by competitive demands for
resources for household consumption. The effect of a change in land or
agricultural output prices on the natural capital stock in period 2 can now
be derived directly from (20) by applying the implicit function theorem
(Varian, 1984). We get
  
1
(21)
and
  
1
(22)
Given that the production function is strictly concave equations (21) and
(22) always generate positive responses to increases in the prices of land or
output in the second period. Thus in the presence of credit markets no per-
verse responses occur and the household behaves in a standard,
profit-maximizing manner. Only in this situation standard cost–benefit
results are obtained.
5. Why may standard cost–benefit analysis be inappropriate?
The above results show that in the absence of credit markets and even if
the future discounted benefits of investment increase, the household may
actually be less inclined to invest. In this case standard cost–benefit analysis
would suggest the opposite because investment becomes more attractive
(Bt increases in formula (1)). This holds for any exogenously given discount
rate, whether it is the market rate of interest or a household-specific
shadow price of time. Hence, cost–benefit analysis will not always be
appropriate as a model of household investment behavior.
The reason why standard cost–benefit analysis may be inappropriate is
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that it is typically assumed that the discount rate is given. First an appro-
priate discount rate is determined, after which the costs and benefits of the
different investment options are compared. In this paper we show that
there are circumstances where this will be problematic, because the dis-
count rate is affected by price changes.
To see this more clearly, consider the discount rate. For the model
without credit market it can be derived as follows.3 The indirect utility
function V(.) of a household for given level of investment is given by sub-
stitution of equations (2)–(4) in equation (1)
V (p1, p2, p1
n, p2
n, I1, K1) 
U (p1 f(K1)  p1
n I1) 
Differentiation of V(.) with respect to investment I1 gives
  p1
n  p2  p2n (1  )
The first term gives the marginal cost of investment, weighted by the mar-
ginal utility of consumption in the first period, while the second term gives
the discounted marginal future benefit of investment, weighted by the
marginal utility of consumption in the second period. If we divide by the
marginal utility of consumption in the first period to obtain an expression
in terms of money instead of utility, we get:4
  p1
n  p2  p2n(1  )
  p1
n  p2  p2n (1  ) (23)
where * is the appropriate discount rate for the household. Expression
(23) again gives the cost–benefit criterion of equation (1): an investment
should be undertaken if the monetary cost of investment (p1
n) exceeds the
discounted monetary benefits of investments p2  p2n (1  ). The
appropriate discount rate is a function of the pure rate of time preference
 and the marginal rate of intertemporal substitution of consumption
*  h(1  )  1.
The discount rate will be a function of prices. If future prices of output or
land increase, the discount rate will increase at any given investment level
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3 Johansson and Löfgren (1989) use a similar method to derive cost–benefit rules
for the case of disequilibrium cost–benefit rules.
4 This expression is equivalent to equation (12).
(C2 increases (eq. (4)) and) 
h(C1, C2)/
C2 	 0), thereby discouraging
further investment. Although price increases of land or output imply
greater monetary benefits of investments p2  p2n (1  ) increases,
the net benefit will be ambiguous because of a ceteris paribus increase in the
discount rate (*) (eq. (23)). Hence, in the presence of credit market imper-
fections, standard cost–benefit analysis based on a pre-determined
discount rate does not automatically lead to correct prescriptions.
In case there is a perfect credit market, the discount rate will be given
and equal the interest rate (see equation (19))
*  h(1  )  1  1  r  1  r
In this case the discount rate is independent of prices, and standard
cost–benefit analysis based on a given discount rate will be appropriate.
The example given in table 1 illustrates this point.
Although there is now a literature extending cost–benefit analysis to
environments with market imperfections and/or disequilibrium effects
(Holden, Shiferaw, and Wik, 1998; Johansson, and Löfgren, 1989), this
literature does not address the issue that the appropriate discount rate may
vary with prices. This paper shows that price-dependent discount rates
may reverse recommendations made on the basis of standard cost–benefit
analysis (which uses a given discount rate).
6. An empirical case study from the Atacora region in Bénin
In this section we discuss an empirical case study to illustrate the above
findings. The intertemporal model shows that the investment responses of
farm households which are liquidity constrained may even be perverse,
with higher output and/or land prices leading to less soil conservation
investment. Households which are not liquidity constrained should
exhibit the expected investment response to higher prices. In our case
study we will show that such perverse investment responses do indeed
occur, and only for households which have not borrowed in the past but
who do indicate a need for credit. The reason why they have not borrowed
is that it was difficult to find somebody to borrow from, the interest rate
was too high, fear of not being able to repay the debt, fear of imprisonment
in case of default, or of being too old to borrow. Because these households
were arguably liquidity constrained (willing but unable to borrow), this
finding does lend support to the theoretical model in the paper.
The case study is drawn from a broader research program on the
‘Agricultural Transition towards Sustainable Tropical Land Use’, financed
by the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research (NWO)
Programme on ‘Environment and the Economy’. Within the Atacora
region in the North-West of Bénin, four villages were visited during a
survey in 1999, and within each village approximately 25 farm households
were randomly selected and interviewed. Research villages were selected
on the basis of population density (from densely to sparsely populated)
and distance to major market places in travel time (both far to nearby
market place). The interviews collected a large amount of information on
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demographics, the farming system, and soil and water conservation
investments of the household (Gandonou and Adégbidi, 2000). Table 2
provides information on a number of general characteristics of the villages.
Within the four study villages three major land conservation invest-
ments can be observed.5 Stone bunds are usually found in villages where
rocky soils are predominant, namely Takouanta and Koutagou. In these
two villages 59, respectively 55 per cent of the plots have stone bunds. Tie-
ridging and ridging are widely used in all the study villages and might be
seen as the most popular soil and water conservation techniques in the
region. They are broadly used and more elaborately in the plains where
gravelly soils and light to high slopes are predominant (Kounakogou).
Most of the crops are planted on ridges except yam which is grown on
mounds (in the bottomlands).
Two versions of the tie-ridging techniques are available. The first one is
known under the local name ‘spenpen’;6 in this version, most of the ridges
are parallel to the slope but they are intersected by a certain number of
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5 See Adégbidi, Gandonou, and Oostendorp, (2000) for an extended discussion of
each of these land conservation techniques.
6 This device is called ‘billonnage cloisonné’ in French.
Table 2. General characteristics of survey villages
Takouanta Okouaro Kounakogou Koutagou
Travel time home to nearest
market
(Median time in minutes)
(a) by foot 90. 20. 90. 90.
(b) by bike 60. 20. 60. 53.
Population density per km2
(1992) 13.6 65.7 64.2 126.3
Number of households (1992) 87. 125 162. 176.
Average household size 5.04 6.80 6.12 7.02
Average plot size (ha) 0.71 0.65 0.66 0.47
Average number of
plots/household 5.84 6.68 4.08 4.20
Percentage of plots with steep
slope 47. 4. 8. 25.
Major types of soil
(% of plots)
(a) rock 40. 2. 8. 51.
(b) gravel 38. 21. 68. 29.
(c) sand/loam 21. 74. 24. 15.
(d)other 1. 3. 0. 5.
Major land conservation
investments
(% of plots)
(a) stone bunds 59. 0. 2. 55.
(b) tie-ridging (type 1) 33. 14. 72. 27.
(c) tie-ridging (type 2) 1. 1. 19. 2.
Source: Survey.
bunds which are perpendicular to the slope. The second version of tie-
ridging is often found on steep plots. Like the former version, the ridges
are also parallel to the slope; however, there are at least two rows of
ridges on each plot instead of one row as observed in the previous
version.
Because the first version of tie-ridging is the dominant form of land con-
servation investment, and is well-represented in each of the villages, we
limit our discussion to this type of land investment. These investments
have large effects on productivity (Adégbidi, Gandonou, and Oostendorp,
2000).7 Also, unlike stone bunds, the ridges are fully reconstructed every
year. The reconstruction work consists in removing the old ridges and
building new ones in the furrows. According to our intertemporal model,
investment responses of farm households which are liquidity constrained
may be perverse, with higher output and/or land prices possibly leading
to less soil conservation investment. Households which are not liquidity
constrained should exhibit the expected investment response to higher
prices. We therefore run two separate investment models, one for house-
holds which did not borrow in the past year but who indicated a need for
credit, and one for households which did borrow or which indicated no
need for credit. Households which did not borrow while indicating a need
for credit are arguably liquidity constrained, while household which did
borrow or indicated no need for credit are not.8 A pooling test is used to
check whether it is indeed appropriate to use two rather than one invest-
ment model. Investment is modelled at the plot-level by whether any
tie-ridging investment has taken place on the plot.
Because we have a cross-sectional dataset, we cannot use output prices
to identify price responses. But we do know the distance between the plot
and the ‘tata’ (homestead) and distances affect the net output price
through transaction costs (particularly transportation costs). Hence, crops
grown on plots which lie further from the tata will typically face lower
output prices (assuming that most of the produce is first transported to the
tata and next to the market), and we can use plot differences in distance to
identify price responses. Distance further affects the price of investment
and the price of land, because the cost of an investment on a plot may be
higher if the plot is further away (perhaps due to higher labour costs) and
because the NPV of future crops grown on the land is lower because of
lower net output prices.9 Hence besides lower net output prices, plots
further from the tata face higher investment cost and lower land prices,
further discouraging investment. In the following we focus on the com-
bined price response from each of these prices.
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7 The investment rationale of stone bunds is also more difficult to asses as almost
all of them have been built by ‘ancestors’ (although maintenance still takes place).
Besides conserving soil and water they also function as property demarcations.
8 This is also called ‘loan-rationing’ in the literature. Here we ignore another type
of credit constraints, namely ‘size-rationing’ (i.e. households may borrow but
they are constrained in the size of the loan).
9 The investment and land prices in the model are given by p1
n and p2
n respectively
(see eqs. (3) and (4)).
The distance from the tata to the market is modelled as household-
specific effect
Pr[Ihp  1]  h  dhp  Xhp   hp
where Ihp is an indicator variable which equals 1 if household h has done
any tie-ridging investment on plot p, h is a household-specific effect, dhp
indicates the distances from plot p to the tata of household h, Xhp is a vector
of other explanatory variables, and hp is a disturbance term. The par-
ameter  gives the price response.
The intertemporal model has the following implications for the price
response parameter :
  	 0 credit constrained 0 not credit constrained
For plots used by households who receive no credit while indicating a
need for it (credit constrained) we expect an ambiguous price response on
investment. For plots used by households receiving credit or indicating no
need for it we expect a response in accordance with standard cost–benefit
analysis—plots with lower net output and land prices and higher invest-
ment prices (that is further away from the tata) receive less investment.
Besides including the distance variable, we also include a number of
other explanatory variables in the regression which may affect the willing-
ness to invest (see for instance Shiferaw and Holden, 1998; Pender and
Kerr, 1998; Neill and Lee, 1999; Shively, 2001). Failure to include these
other variables may lead to a biased price response estimate because of
omitted variables bias. Plot slope is included because steeper slopes (par-
ticularly where rainfall is high) increase the incentive to invest in land
protection and to adopt less-erosive forms of land use. Soil type is included
to control for differences in the erodibility of the soil. The number of plots
owned by the household and the size of the plot are also included. We
expect that as farm fragmentation increases farmers will have less incen-
tive to make land improvements because of higher transaction costs.
Larger plots are more likely to receive investments if there are fixed costs
to investment on a plot, such as transportation costs. Plot fertility is also
included in the regression as the incentive to investment is higher for less
fertile plots.10 The availability of labour and/or capital will also affect
investment if labour and/or credit markets are imperfect (Pender and Kerr,
1998). We therefore include the number of household members and the
number of livestock in the household (in tropical livestock units). A
dummy whether the plot is borrowed is also included as farmers may be
less willing to invest in plots not owned. Finally village dummies are
included to control for village-specific factors possibly affecting invest-
ment, such as the quality of the infrastructure, social and administrative
conditions in the village, and differences in rainfall.
The regression model is estimated as logit, and the household-specific
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10 Plot fertility is measured as whether the farmer has indicated that the plot
belongs to the top half of the most fertile plots within the household.
effects have been modelled as random effects. A Hausman test does not
reject random effects against fixed effects. A Chow test has been performed
to test whether the sample should be split, and is significant at a level of
0.058. This indeed suggests that credit constrained households behave dif-
ferently from non-constrained households.11 Table 3 reports the price
elasticity for households which are credit constrained and which are not
credit constrained.
The table shows an ambiguous (not significantly different from zero)
price response for households which did not borrow in the past and which
did not indicate a need for credit. Households which did borrow or indi-
cated no need for credit show the expected price response. Hence, our case
study does lend support to the theoretical model in the paper.
7. Conclusions
Starting from the observation that many farm households, and especially
those in developing countries, are credit constrained this paper investi-
gates the reliability of cost–benefit predictions on the attractiveness of soil
conservation projects. We show that contrary to the predictions of
cost–benefit analysis, higher prices for agricultural produce or land do
not have to result in unambiguous investment responses in soil conser-
vation. We find that an increase in the NPV for a conservation project is
no indisputable indication of whether a farm household will be more
likely to adopt the project. In fact, even perverse investment reactions to
increased price incentives cannot be excluded. Whether or not such
responses occur is an empirical matter. Our case study from the Atacora
region in Bénin suggests that they arise indeed. It follows that, in the
absence of credit markets, cost–benefit results have to be interpreted with
care in determining whether a given investment project is attractive for
farmers.
An immediate policy implication of our results is that the likelihood of
a positive conservation response to increased prices is enhanced when
higher land or agricultural output prices are accompanied by the pro-
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11 First a regression is run with all households on all variables and a dummy for
those that are credit constrained, plus all variables interacted with this dummy.
The Chow test is calculated as a likelihood ratio test on whether the two groups
are significantly different, i.e. whether the coefficients on the credit dummy and
all the variables interacted with this dummy are jointly significantly different
from zero.
Table 3. Price elasticity and liquidity constraints (t-values in parentheses)
Constrained households Unconstrained households
Price elasticity 0.09 0.22
(0.67) (2.28)
Number of plots 294 215
Pseudo R2 0.31 0.19
Note: the elasticity is calculated as the average elasticity of the probability of
investment with respect to the distance variable.
vision of access to credit. An additional implication is that of the many
policies that could lead to enhancing investments in soil conservation—
varying from increases in the demand for land to the abolishment price
controls on agricultural produce—the introduction of credit markets
should be considered as well. Especially if one intends to induce the poor
to invest in soil conservation, introducing credit markets is an important
consideration.
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Appendix
Applying the implicit function theorem and differentiating with respect to
p2
n yields
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 p1
n 1 0
p2  p2
n(1  ) 0  1
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Using Cramer’s rule one gets equation (13)
 ((1  ))  (1  )K2  (1  ) p1n
The determinant is equal to
p2  p2  p2n (1  )  (1  )p1n
   (1  )(p1n)2
It is negative by assumption. This follows from the strict concavity of the
production function and the subutility functions which induces the first
term to be negative, the second positive (before it is multiplied by 1) and
the third to be negative again.
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